Wage and hour cases are common in New York
INTRODUCTION
Between 1999 and 2007, the Saigon Grill in New York City employed thirty-six Chinese immigrants as delivery workers. 1 None spoke English fluently, and none had received more than a "rudimentary" education in China. 2 They routinely worked thirteen-hour shifts, often without meal breaks, for as little as $1.60 an hour. 3 Thanks to federal and state wage and hour laws, their lawsuit resulted in a multimillion dollar award for back pay and damages. 4 The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 5 (FLSA) authorizes employees to file private actions to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, plus an additional sum equaling 100 percent of those underpaid wages 6 as mandatory liquidated damages. 7 An employer may avoid liability for liquidated damages only upon demonstrating that it acted in "good faith" and had "reasonable grounds" for believing that its behavior did not violate the FLSA. 8 (McKinney Supp. 2013 ), this Note uses the term colloquially to reference an employee's compensation for labor or services. This Note employs more specific terms, such as "minimum wage," "overtime compensation," or "regular rate," in accordance with statutory definitions, indicated as appropriate, infra.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (authorizing private actions and specifying the recovery available); see also id. § 206 (establishing a federal minimum wage); id. § 207(a)(1) (limiting workweek unless employee receives "one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed" for hours exceeding forty). Such conformity, however, did not always exist. An old New York statute enacted in 1967 (1967 Version) authorized employees to recover their unpaid wages, plus an additional 25 percent of those wages as liquidated damages if they could demonstrate that their employer's violation was willful. 10 Divergent interpretations of that statute created a split within the Second Circuit over whether liquidated damages could be awarded under both the federal and state statutes for the same underpaid wage or whether such an award would constitute an impermissible double recovery. Some courts reasoned that double recovery was avoided because the two liquidated damages provisions served different purposes-the FLSA's compensatory and the NYLL's punitive-while others reasoned that only a single award was appropriate because each provision remedied the same harm or served the same practical purpose. 11 In 2009, an amendment (2009 Amendment) removed the willfulness requirement. 12 In 2010, another amendment (2010 Amendment) increased the amount of liquidated damages from 25 percent of the unpaid wages to 100 percent. 13 Despite the statutory overhaul, district courts in the Second Circuit have not seriously reassessed their positions, and some continue applying interpretations of the 1967 Version to the new statutory text. 14 Consequently, questions remain as to whether a plaintiff may recover liquidated damages under both statutes for the same underpaid wage. The answer depends on whether courts will construe the current statute, based upon its text and legislative history, as exclusively compensatory or punitive in purpose. If left unaddressed, this issue threatens to perpetuate a practice of inconsistent awards in wage and hour cases.
Consistency in wage and hour cases is increasingly important, because headline-grabbing cases like Saigon Grill 15 form only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the scourge of wage and hour violations plaguing New York and the nation. America's low-wage workers regularly suffer minimum wage and overtime compensation violations. 16 In 2008, the National Employment Law Project (NELP) surveyed 4,387 workers in lowwage industries in major American cities, including Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. 17 The survey revealed that 26 percent of respondents were paid less than the required minimum wage. 18 Further, 25 percent of respondents reported working overtime, 76 percent of whom were paid less than the required overtime rate. 19 Moreover, the average overtime worker accumulated eleven hours of overtime per week that were "either underpaid or not paid at all." 20 New York City's figures parallel the national data. 21 The harms of wage and hour violations extend far beyond those inflicted upon individual workers-they also ripple throughout the economy. 22 Wage underpayment deprives communities of business-and job-sustaining spending, limits economic development, reduces tax revenues, and burdens social safety nets. 23 It creates unfair competition for honest employers and drives down other workers' wages. 24 25 Wage and hour cases now represent one of the "fastest growing areas of litigation," and "mill" specialist firms have emerged across the country. 26 The trend shows no signs of easing, due to an unbalanced labor market exacerbated by the recent economic downturn. 27 Although job losses were widespread during the recession, they hit mid-wage occupations the hardest and pushed many workers into low-wage positions. 28 Post-recession job growth has concentrated on low-wage occupations, growing 2.7 times faster than mid-wage and high-wage positions. 29 Compounding these effects, low-wage jobs account for "eight out of the top 10 occupations projected to grow the most by 2018." 30 This 28. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 27, at 1. Low-wage occupations constituted 21 percent of job losses, mid-wage 60 percent, and high-wage 19 percent. See id.; see also Rampell, supra note 27 (discussing studies about the "polarization" of skills and wages). NELP defines "lower-wage occupations" as those with median hourly wages of $7.69 to $13.83, "mid-wage occupations" as $13.84 to $21.13, and "higher-wage occupations" as $21.14 to $54.55. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 27, at 2.
29. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 27, at 1. Low-wage occupations constituted 58 percent of job growth, mid-wage 22 percent, and high-wage 20 percent. See id.; see also Rampell, supra note 27.
30. Bernhardt, supra note 21, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 37 (describing these occupations as "home care and child care workers, dishwashers, food prep[aration] workers, construction workers, cashiers, laundry workers, garment workers, security guards and janitors"); see also Letter from Nat'l Emp't Law Project to Governor David A. Paterson This part begins with an introduction to the relevant FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages provisions before proceeding to a general discussion of related legal concepts, including the double recovery doctrine, the respective purposes of compensatory and punitive damages, the various roles that statutory multiple damages play, and the basic tenets of New York statutory construction. This part concludes with the leading judicial interpretations characterizing the FLSA's liquidated damages as compensatory and the 1967 Version's as punitive.
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
The FLSA and NYLL have a lot in common. This section sketches the basic framework of each statute's liquidated damages provisions.
The Fair Labor Standards Act
The FLSA is a comprehensive federal statute governing a wide array of employment matters. 31 Among its most basic provisions are 29 U.S.C. § 206, establishing the federal minimum wage, and § 207, requiring overtime compensation at 150 percent of an employee's regular rate. 32 Such measures are intended to protect vulnerable low-wage workers from economic distress while promoting their health and general well-being. . An employee's "regular rate" should not be confused with the "minimum wage" rate. Compare id. § 206 (specifying the minimum wage rate), with id. § 207(e) (defining "regular rate" for purposes of overtime compensation calculations).
33. See id. § 202(a) (declaring Congress's intent to protect the "minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers"); see also United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361 (1945) (observing Congress's intent to protect workers "from the evils and dangers resulting from wages too low to buy the bare necessities of life and from long hours of work injurious to health"); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942) (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt's message emphasizing the FLSA's provision of "[a] fair day's pay for a fair day's work" and of protections from the "evil" of "overwork" and "underpay"); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) (citing Congress's concern over the "maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for health and general well-being" of workers). Section 216(b) authorizes private actions to safeguard the FLSA's reforms. 34 In such actions, employers that have violated § 206 or § 207 "shall be liable" not only for unpaid wages but also "an additional equal amount as liquidated damages" (i.e., 100 percent liquidated damages). 35 These liquidated damages are automatic and do not require an employee to demonstrate that an employer's violation arose willfully or due to any other culpable state of mind. 36 Until 1947, liquidated damages awards were mandatory in all successful actions brought under § 216(b). 37 At that time, Congress, reacting to early U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting § 216, enacted the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act 38 (PPA), which provided employers with opportunities to avoid liquidated damages in certain situations. 39 First, the PPA allowed for the compromise of claims "if there exists a bona fide dispute as to the amount payable," as well as for the waiver of liquidated damages. 40 Next, the PPA set a two-year statute of limitations for FLSA claims, since none had existed previously. 41 acted in "good faith" and had "reasonable grounds" for believing that its behavior did not violate the FLSA. 42 Establishing the good-faith defense requires demonstrating affirmative steps taken to ascertain and comply with the FLSA. 43 Thus, ignorance and negligence are inadequate defenses. 44 The employer's burden is "difficult" to meet and must be met by "plain and substantial evidence." 45 Like the FLSA, the NYLL governs a wide array of employment matters. Many of its provisions parallel the FLSA's, such as those establishing a minimum wage 47 and requiring overtime compensation at 150 percent of an employee's regular rate. 48 Further, section 198(1-a) authorizes private enforcement actions, in which an underpaid employee shall recover unpaid wages plus an "additional amount as liquidated damages equal to one hundred percent of the total amount of the wages found to be due." 49 Finally, an employer can avoid the NYLL's automatic liquidated damages upon proving a good-faith basis for believing that the underpayment complied with the law. 50 Only recently, however, has such great conformity between the two liquidated damages provisions arisen.
The governed the payment of wages. 51 Article 6, entitled "Payment of Wages," provided for a fifty dollar civil penalty, payable to the state, for the failure of a "corporation or joint-stock association" to pay its employees' wages. 52 Subsequently, the legislature enacted a series of amendments, which gradually broadened the provision's scope to a wider variety of employers and employees. 53 Acts passed in 1966 and 1967, however, marked dramatic departures from the simple fifty-dollar civil penalty traditionally paid into state coffers. 54 In 1966, the New York State Department of Labor (NYDOL) sponsored the recodification of article 6. 55 The language governing the fifty-dollar civil penalty was moved from section 198 to section 197, which retained the heading "Civil penalty," 56 and the new section 198, labeled "Costs, remedies," provided that a prevailing employee "may" recover "in addition to ordinary costs, a reasonable sum, not exceeding fifty dollars for expenses which may be taxed as costs." 57 One year later, New York added section 198(1-a), which required employers to pay employees who prevailed in court an additional 25 percent of unpaid wages as "liquidated damages" for "willful" violations of the state's wage and hour laws. 58 The 1967 Version's language remained unchanged for decades until 2009, when New York eliminated the willfulness requirement and replaced it with a presumption that liquidated damages are available unless the employer establishes a good-faith defense. 59 In any action instituted upon a wage claim by an employee or the commissioner in which the employee prevails, the court shall allow such employee reasonable attorney's fees and, upon a finding that the employer's failure to pay the wage required by this article was willful, an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to twenty-five percent of the total amount of the wages found to be due.
Id.
59. 
B. Double Recovery and Damages
After explaining the double recovery doctrine, this section discusses compensatory and punitive damages, which are two types of damages available at law. Understanding the role that each category plays is essential when determining the nature or purpose of a statutory multiple damages provision, as described toward the end of this subsection.
Double Recovery
The potential for double recovery inevitably arises in New York wage and hour cases when plaintiffs allege violations of both the FLSA and NYLL. The FLSA has a two-year statute of limitations that expands to three years for willful violations. 64 The NYLL, on the other hand, has a six-year statute of limitations, regardless of willfulness. 65 When a prevailing plaintiff claims both federal and state damages arising from back pay accrued during the overlapping two-to three-year period, courts must determine whether to award damages under the federal statute, the state statute, or both.
As the Supreme Court has declared, "courts can and should preclude double recovery." 66 The double recovery doctrine restricts a plaintiff to a single recovery for a single injury, even if the plaintiff pleads and tries multiple or alternative legal theories of recovery. 67 and a state claim arise from the same injury and seek the same relief, damages awarded under both theories would constitute a double recovery. 68 In the absence of punitive damages, a plaintiff can recover no more than the loss actually suffered, because a larger award would produce a windfall. 69 That said, compensatory awards for multiple injuries stemming from a single act or omission do not offend double recovery, provided they do not encompass duplicative elements or exceed the aggregate harm caused. 70 To illustrate, both the FLSA and NYLL provide for the full recovery of unpaid overtime compensation. 71 Although these statutes overlap, courts will not permit plaintiffs to recover those wages twice, because doing so would award a windfall. 72 The doctrine's application, however, is less straightforward where liquidated damages are involved. In addition to the underlying wage, both the FLSA and NYLL provide for multiple damages as liquidated damages. 73 Whether prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to both sets of liquidated damages depends upon whether each is considered compensatory or punitive in nature. 74 ecovery by a party of more than the maximum recoverable loss that the party has sustained"); id. at 1738 (defining "windfall" as "[a]n unanticipated benefit, usu. in the form of a profit and not caused by the recipient"); see also 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 1.1, at 4 (describing punitive damages as "noncompensatory" damages). 
Compensatory Damages, Prejudgment Interest, and Liquidated Damages
Compensatory damages redress the actual losses a plaintiff has suffered. 77 They are intended to make the plaintiff whole again, restoring the position that would have been occupied had an injury never occurred. 78 Compensatory damages are limited to the amount a plaintiff actually lost, because a plaintiff should not receive a windfall or profit from an injury. 79 Prejudgment interest is a type of compensatory damage, because it is an equitable award that compensates plaintiffs for the lost use of money during a period preceding the entry of judgment. 80 It represents part of a plaintiff's actual damages and is designed to make the plaintiff whole. 81 In federal actions, prejudgment interest awards are typically discretionary. 82 Usually, (awarding both state liquidated damages and state prejudgment interest on the same underpaid wage, because each award serves a different purpose); Phelan v. Local 305 of the United Ass'n of Journeymen, 973 F.2d 1050, 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) ("When a plaintiff receives a payment from one source for an injury, defendants are entitled to a credit of that amount against any judgment obtained by the plaintiff as long as both payments represent common damages"); 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-148 to -149 (" [S] everal courts have held that an employer is subject to both state and federal remedial measures that the court finds are not duplicative.").
77. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 445 (defining "actual damages" as " [a] n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses" and as "compensatory damages"); see also Campbell, 538 U. (specifying that prejudgment interest should be calculated "from the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed" or when damage was incurred); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.6(1)- (2) a pecuniary award will not fully compensate a plaintiff unless it includes an "interest component." 83 Therefore, when damages represent compensation for lost wages, "it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include prejudgment interest" in some manner. 84 Practically, prejudgment interest prevents employers from "enjoy[ing] an interest-free loan" at their employees' expense and promotes settlements by discouraging defendants from delaying payments to injured plaintiffs. 85 Despite these deterrent effects, prejudgment interest is not considered to be a punitive award or an additional penalty because the "essential rationale" for awarding prejudgment interest is ensuring that a plaintiff is fully compensated. 86 Finally, parties may stipulate to the recovery of "liquidated damages"-predetermined or estimated amounts-in lieu of actual damages. 87 Liquidated damages help aggrieved parties avoid the difficulty, expense, and uncertainty of itemizing and proving damages in court. 88 83. Kansas [T]he sum fixed is the measure of damages . . . , whether it exceeds or falls short of the actual damages."). Of course, statutory multiple damages differ from traditional liquidated damages, because the parties do not specify them-the legislature sets them instead. As the Second Circuit observed, the FLSA's use of the phrase is "something of a misnomer." Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1063 n.3 (2d Cir. 1988).
88. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-718 (McKinney 2002) (allowing certain contracting parties to set liquidated damages "at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty."); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 446, 448 (distinguishing "general damages," which 3. Punitive Damages Punitive damages have a long history in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 89 Today, American courts consider punitive damages to be a category of damages distinct from compensatory damages. 90 Courts regularly instruct juries on the twin goals of modern punitive awards: deterrence and retribution. 91 Thus, a defendant's culpability is an important factor, and courts typically limit punitive damages to cases of "enormity, where a defendant's conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence, willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the rights of others, or behavior even more deplorable." 92 Large punitive awards might be justified when wrongdoing is hard to detect or when an injury and its corresponding compensatory award are small. 93 Thus, punitive damages frequently result from torts and "do not need to be specifically claimed," from "special damages," which must be "specifically claimed or proved").
89. 92. Baker, 554 U.S. at 493 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Day, 54 U.S. at 371; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 448 (defining "punitive damages" as " [d] amages awarded in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit; specif., damages assessed by way of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to others" and explaining that punitive damages are intended to punish and deter "blameworthy" conduct); 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 90, § 9.3(A), at 634-39.
93. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 494 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982) ("It is in the nature of punitive remedies to authorize awards that may be out of proportion to actual injury; such remedies typically are established to deter particular conduct, and the legislature not infrequently finds that harsh consequences must be visited upon those whose conduct it would deter.").
serve broad societal purposes 94 and may even function like criminal penalties. 95 
Statutory Multiple Damages
Many statutes specify awards that double, triple, or multiply damages by some other factor. 96 Such multiple damages can be compensatory or punitive in nature. 97 The distinction between compensatory and punitive statutory damages is especially significant in New York, because a state procedural rule bars recovery of statutory penalties in class actions unless the statute imposing the penalty specifically authorizes class recovery. 98 Punitive statutory multiple damages differ from the common law punitive damages because statutes cap the maximum punitive award. 99 The fixed limit may reduce the potential threat to a defendant and "the possibility of a measured deterrence. 95. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417; see also 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.11(1), at 457 (explaining that punitive damages serve "as a means of securing public good through a kind of quasi-criminal punishment in the civil suit"). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court observed, "[a]lthough these awards serve the same purposes as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding." 538 U.S. at 417. The Court used "three guideposts" to analyze the reasonableness of a $145 million punitive award accompanying only $1 million in compensatory damages, including: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Id.; see also Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 424; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. The most important guidepost is "the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
96. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 511-12 (collecting various statutes exemplifying multiple damages provisions); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 541-42 (same); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 447 (defining "multiple damages" as "[s]tatutory damages (such as double or treble damages) that are a multiple of the amount that the factfinder determines to be owed").
97. 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 543. 99. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 491 (distinguishing common law punitive damages as "untethered to strict numerical multipliers" of statutes); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 543 n.17 (explaining that extrastatutory punitive awards are "largely discretionary").
100. 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 543.
Statutory multiple damages can also serve "entirely non-punitive purposes." 101 Some provide liquidated damages for actual losses that are difficult to prove or otherwise unrecognized by the law. 102 Others may induce private enforcement of matters of public importance, which might otherwise remain financially unattractive causes of action. 103 When it comes to characterizing the nature of statutory multiple damages, the presence of a "willfulness" or a similar scienter requirement is often a key distinction between punitive and compensatory provisions. 104 The word "willful," although "widely used in the law," lacks a clear definition and is "generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely negligent. hree practical characteristics" convinced the Bailey Court that a purported tax on child labor was actually a penalty: (1) the burden imposed was "exceedingly heavy"; (2) only those who "knowingly" violated the law had to pay; and (3) enforcement was by the Department of Labor, "an agency responsible for punishing violations of labor laws, not collecting revenue." Id.
107. 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 544 (citing 15. U.S.C.A. § 117 and 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(a)); 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 90, § 2.1(B), at 25-28 (describing the important role culpability requirements play when identifying statutory multiple damages provisions as punitive or nonpunitive). absence of a willfulness or scienter requirement, however, will not necessarily disqualify a punitive characterization. 108 
C. Statutory Construction
Issues of statutory construction lie at the heart of this Note. After introducing relevant principles of New York statutory construction, this section examines leading decisions coloring the "purpose" or "nature" of the FLSA and of the 1967 Version's liquidated damages provisions.
Principles of New York Statutory Construction
In New York, legislative intent is the "great and controlling principle" in statutory construction, 109 and statutory text is the primary source of legislative intent. 110 The text of a multiple damages provision, however, might not unambiguously suggest either a compensatory or a punitive purpose. When statutory text is unclear, courts may attempt to divine legislative intent from extrinsic sources, such as legislative history. 111 Such sources can help courts determine how the legislature intended to "suppress the evil and advance the remedy" of a particular "mischief," 112 or further the general underlying "object, spirit and purpose of the statute." 113 108. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (finding that a multiple damages provision lacking a culpability requirement in the Jones Act was not "merely" or "exclusively" compensatory, since the legislature had also designed it "to prevent, by its coercive effect" delayed payments to seamen). 110. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § § 76, 94 ("The legislative intent is to be ascertained from the words and language used, and the statutory language is generally construed according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction."); Albany Law Sch., 968 N.E.2d at 974 ("As we have repeatedly stated, the text of a provision 'is the clearest indicator of legislative intent and courts should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning. Generally, legislative history is comprised of documents reflecting the information that lawmakers considered before enacting the legislation. 114 Although Congress generates vast amounts of legislative history, state legislative history is typically sparse. 115 In New York, committee reports and debate records are rare; all the courts typically have to rely upon are governor's bill jackets. 116 Bill jackets cobble together assorted materials, which may include a sponsor's memorandum, constituents' letters concerning legislation awaiting the governor's signature, or a governor's statement approving or vetoing a bill-in other words, "[n]ot much of a window on legislative intent." 117 Even when relevant materials are available, they deserve only "some weight in the absence of more definitive manifestations of legislative purpose" and "must be cautiously used." 118 A governor's statements may be examined in an analysis of legislative intent, but such statements "suffer from the same infirmities" as those that legislators make during floor debates-namely that "it is impossible to determine with certainty" whether an individual's views are attributable to an entire legislative body. 119 In many instances, extrinsic aids for determining state legislative intent do not exist at all. 120 When federal laws are models for state laws, however, Congress's intent and the history of the federal laws may inform interpretations of the state laws, since the state legislature presumably had the same objectives where it employed similar terminology. 121 125 The Court explained that regardless of an employer's good faith or reasonableness, the liquidated damages provision neither violates due process nor warrants shifting the burden of proof to employees who are "no more at fault than the employer." 126 The Court distinguished § 216's liquidated damages from the "threat of criminal proceedings," "prohibitive fines," and "double damages treated as penalties." 127 The Court also emphasized that § 216 provides "compensation, not a penalty or punishment," because wage underpayments "may well result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages." 128 A few years later, the Court reinforced Missel's characterization of § 216's liquidated damages as compensatory. 129 1-a) does not apply to a common law breach of contract claim. 150 Based on materials in the bill jacket, Gottlieb concluded that supporters of the 1967 Version treated all of the remedies in section 198 as "addressing the same problem (i.e., employers' violation of the wage laws), having the same objective (enhancing enforcement of the Labor Law's substantive wage enforcement provisions), and providing cumulative remedies for wage claims brought thereunder." 151 The court cited NYDOL's supporting memorandum, which, according to the court, frames the bill's "sole" purpose as " [t] o assist the enforcement of the wage payment and minimum wage payment laws by imposing greater sanctions on employers for violation of those laws." 152 The court also cited a memorandum from the state AFL-CIO, which characterizes section 198(1-a)'s provisions for attorney's fees and liquidated damages collectively as "one more safeguard to assure employees of proper payment of wages under the law and would thus be a deterrent against abuses and violations." 153 Carter laid the foundation for the Second Circuit's decision in Reilly v. NatWest Markets Group Inc., 154 which held that an employee may recover state prejudgment interest in addition to the 1967 Version's liquidated damages for the same underlying wage. 155 same loss." 158 However, the Reilly court found the bankruptcy court's reasoning "unpersuasive." 159 Because of Carter's determination that "liquidated damages under [section 198(1-a)] 'constitute a penalty' to deter an employer's willful withholding of wages," the Second Circuit concluded that the 1967 Version's liquidated damages were exclusively punitive in nature. 160 The court permitted Reilly to recover both state liquidated damages and state prejudgment interest, because the awards "serve fundamentally different purposes" and are not "functional equivalents." 161 
II. THE QUAGMIRE: THE UNDERLYING INTRACIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE CONFLICTING SIGNALS THE 2009 AND 2010 AMENDMENTS SEND
Although Reilly addressed the intersection of state prejudgment interest and state liquidated damages, that decision came to serve as the basis for an intracircuit split over whether plaintiffs may, under the 1967 Version, recover both FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages upon the same unpaid wages (i.e., 125 percent liquidated damages). Courts awarding recovery under both statutes reasoned that each liquidated damages provision served a different purpose, so no double recovery occurred. 162 Other courts adopted the position that the FLSA and NYLL's liquidated damages provisions remedied the same harms or accomplished the same practical purposes, so awarding both would offend double recovery. 163 Before the Second Circuit addressed the split, the state legislature amended section 198(1-a) twice. 164 In light of these amendments, a new analysis is necessary to guide courts facing demands for both state and federal liquidated damages on the same underlying wage. Reilly was decided a decade before these amendments drastically changed the statute's text. The Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals have acknowledged the amendments, but neither has interpreted them. 165 Of course, a judicial determination of legislative purpose is a prerequisite to the "different purposes" analysis. As discussed in this part, only a handful of district courts have recognized the need for fresh analysis. Others continue to apply interpretations of the 1967 Version to the amended text. 166 This part begins by supplementing the discussions in Carter and Gottlieb regarding the 1967 Version's legislative history. 167 Then, it presents the changes that the 2009 and 2010 Amendments' wrought upon section 198(1-a) and provides evidence of the state legislature's motivations for enacting those amendments.
A. Revisiting the 1967 Version's Legislative History
Nothing in Reilly suggests that the Second Circuit independently examined the legislative history underlying Carter's decision. In fact, the very same governor's memorandum upon which Carter relies explicitly asserts that the 1967 Version's liquidated damages would "compensate the employee for the loss of the use of the money to which he was entitled." 168 Carter omits this language from its quotation, although it is in the memorandum's next sentence. 169 Governor Rockefeller's memorandum echoed statements other interested parties expressed before the 1967 Version became law-statements which the Carter and Gottlieb analyses both omit. 170 Such statements are memorialized in the 1967 Version's bill jacket, which contains not only the governor's memorandum but also numerous other submissions. 171 For example, the sponsor's memorandum explains that liquidated damages would serve both punitive and compensatory purposes. 172 First, as "stronger sanctions," they would result in "greater compliance with the law." 173 Second, they would "compensate the employee for the loss of the use of the money to which he was entitled." 174 Similarly, the Division of Budget observed that liquidated damages would both "improve compliance" and "repay workers for a good deal of anguish, time and money." 175 Furthermore, NYDOL, the agency responsible for enforcing the NYLL, also commented on the provision's dual purposes. 176 NYDOL's memorandum justified liquidated damages as both a way to "impos[e] greater sanctions" against violators and a way to compensate underpaid workers while avoiding complicated back pay calculations. 177 
B. The Importance of "Willfulness" or Similar Scienter Requirements
In addition to legislative history, Carter rests upon the 1967 Version's text-namely its explicit inclusion of a "willfulness" requirement. 178 The 2009 Amendment eliminated that requirement. 179 Now, the NYLL, like the FLSA, presumes liquidated damages are available unless an employer can establish a good-faith defense. 180 The following discussion explores the roles scienter requirements played in three U.S. Supreme Court opinions interpreting analogous statutory multiple damages provisions.
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 181 the Supreme Court addressed whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's 182 (ADEA) inclusion of a willfulness requirement distinguished its liquidated damages provision from the FLSA's. 183 Congress passed the ADEA in 1967 as an amendment to the FLSA. 184 Section 7(b) of the ADEA was modeled on and explicitly incorporates the FLSA's liquidated damages provision, but limits such awards to "cases of willful violations." 185 The Court, recognizing Congress's familiarity with the FLSA's provisions and with judicial interpretations of them, held that Congress intended the ADEA's liquidated damages to be punitive in nature, because the willfulness proviso "significantly" distinguished the ADEA's provision from the FLSA's. 186 Consequently, the ADEA's liquidated damages are only available for violations when an employee demonstrates an employer's knowledge of or reckless disregard for the law. 187 After Thurston, an intercircuit split arose over whether ADEA liquidated damages displaced prejudgment interest, or whether they were "strictly punitive" and prejudgment interest could supplement them. 188 The Second Circuit, following Thurston's characterization of the ADEA's liquidated damages as punitive, reasoned that prejudgment interest and ADEA liquidated damages serve different purposes, so both can be recovered on the same wage claim. 189 Subsequently ADEA liquidated damages. 191 In Schleier, the Court rejected Schleier's argument that Congress intended "liquidated damages under the ADEA serve, at least in part, to compensate plaintiffs for personal injuries that are difficult to quantify" by incorporating the FLSA's liquidated damages provision. 192 The Court acknowledged that portions of the ADEA's legislative history supported Schleier's position. 193 Nonetheless, the Court invoked precedent: "We have already concluded that the liquidated damages provisions of the ADEA were a significant departure from those in the FLSA, and we explicitly held in Thurston: 'Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature. '" 194 The Court stressed the importance of the willfulness requirement, explaining that, "[i]f liquidated damages were designed to compensate ADEA victims, we see no reason why the employer's knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct should be the determinative factor in the award of liquidated damages." 195 On the other hand, the Court does not always condition a punitive characterization upon the inclusion of a willfulness or scienter requirement. In Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 196 a seaman sued his former employer for unpaid wages and penalties under the Jones Act, which the Court explained had authorized seamen who were not paid promptly upon discharge to recover "two days' pay for each and every day" of delay in which a shipmaster or owner "refuses or neglects to make payment . . . without sufficient cause." 197 The district court, in its discretion, had reduced the time period in which Griffin's overdue wages remained outstanding, ultimately calculating a penalty of $6,881.60. 198 Griffin appealed, arguing that a literal application of the statute precluded such discretion and that he should have received over $300,000 because of the $412.50 in wages Oceanic had withheld. 199 Oceanic responded that the statute served remedial and compensatory purposes, so the award Griffin sought was "so far in excess of any equitable remedy as to be punitive." 200 Agreeing with Oceanic, the Court observed that it was "highly probable" that the damages Griffin sought would "greatly exceed[] any actual injury" the delayed payment had caused. 201 Still, the Court ruled for Griffin, because the statutory awards were not "merely" or "exclusively" compensatory, but also punitive since Congress had designed the statute "to prevent, by its coercive effect, arbitrary refusals to pay wages, and to induce prompt payment when payment is possible." 202 Aside from eliminating the willfulness requirement, nothing in the text or legislative history of the 2009 or the 2010 Amendments suggests that the New York legislature intended to change the punitive gloss that courts, like Reilly, had assigned to section 198(1-a)'s liquidated damages provision. Then again, nothing acknowledges that gloss in the first place. 203 Rather, the 2009 Amendment was introduced at the request of NYDOL to "expand worker protections and remedies against employers who violate Labor Law requirements related to wage payment." 204 The bill raised section 215's penalties, untouched since the 1960s, but the amount of liquidated damages available to employees under section 198(1-a) remained at 25 percent. 205 Instead, as the bill's sponsor and NYDOL both explained, the bill shifted section 198(1-a)'s burden of proof to eliminate the "inherent unfairness" of requiring an employee to shoulder the "onerous burden" of demonstrating that an employer's violation was willful to obtain liquidated damages. 206 The bill's sponsor expected primarily low-wage workers "struggling to support their families on the minimum wage" to benefit from this change. 207 [Vol. 81
C. The NYLL's Newfound Conformity with the FLSA
In effect, the 2009 and 2010 Amendments conform the NYLL's liquidated damages provision to the FLSA's. Together, the amendments eliminated section 198(1-a)'s willfulness requirement, provided employers with a good-faith defense, and increased liquidated damages from 25 percent to 100 percent. 208 Since the amendments' enactment, however, no court interpreting section 198(1-a) has acknowledged a legislative intent to attain any degree of conformity with federal law. Still, some courts have commented on the laws' effective convergence as impacting the analysis underlying the intracircuit split. 209 As Magistrate Judge James Orenstein remarked in dicta, "To the extent the federal and state statutes now provide for essentially identical remedies with respect to liquidated damages, it is harder to argue that they are designed to compensate a plaintiff for disparate harms." 210 Similarly, Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein has also observed that the federal and state provisions now address the same harms. 211 Finally, Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck found the arguments favoring a single set of liquidated damages "even more compelling" now that the NYLL's liquidated damages "mirror" the FLSA's. 212 Although courts have not mentioned it, the legislative history does address the NYLL's conformity with the FLSA. In support of the 2009 Amendment, the sponsor's memorandum stated that the bill would "conform New York law to the Fair Labor Standards Act." 213 Similarly, NYDOL, the agency responsible for enforcement, submitted a memorandum reiterating the sponsor's observation. 214 The Legal Aid Society 215 and NELP 216 also submitted memoranda noting the state's step toward conformity with the FLSA.
In 2009, the state avoided full conformity with the FLSA. 217 Whatever reservations may have existed in 2009, however, were overcome by 2010, when the WTPA increased liquidated damages from 25 percent to 100 percent. 218 This time, however, neither the bill's sponsor, NYDOL, nor the governor mentioned conformity with the FLSA. 219 Nevertheless, interested third parties noted the effect. For example, the Legal Aid Society observed, "Damages owed, on top of wages, will be increased from 25% to 100%-matching the damage level in twenty-four other States and under federal law." 220 Other parties making similar observations include Coalition for the Homeless, 221 Jobs with Justice, 222 and Make the Road. 223 
D. The Twin Goals of Deterrence and Retribution
Before Governor Rockefeller signed the 1967 Version into law, constituents were already criticizing its weak enforcement scheme. For example, although ultimately supporting enactment, the New York County Lawyers' Association complained that the bill's protections did not go far enough. 224 As the association explained, "The category of workers to whom these remedies are directed are notoriously low paid, and, the remedies, even as improved by the proposal, do not approach the potential of the remedies of the [FLSA] which allows up to 100% of liquidated damages." 225 Likewise, the New York State Bar Association Committee on Labor characterized the 25 percent liquidated damages as "minimal," since similar violations of federal law would lead to recovery of "an amount equal to the unpaid wages as liquidated damages." 226 These concerns remained germane for decades. In 1997, New York passed the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, 227 which, inter alia, increased criminal penalties under section 198-a. 228 For repeat offenders, the act also authorized officials to collect a "sum as a civil penalty in an amount equal to double the total [wages] found to be due," while liquidated damages remained at 25 percent. 229 In a statement of purpose, the legislature lamented the continued "[e]xploitation of these most vulnerable workers," especially those in the garment and service industries. 230 It asserted, "The purpose of this legislation, therefore, is to provide [NYDOL] and working people with stronger and more varied tools with which to collect unpaid wages." 231 As the governor's memorandum explained, "Increasing the monetary penalties against dishonest employers will help deter wage law violations." 232 In 2009, the legislature once again increased penalties but not liquidated damages. 233 The 2010 Amendment, however, increased section 198(1-a)'s liquidated damages for the first time in nearly forty-five years. 234 The WTPA's bill jacket brims with statements about the need to deter and punish wage and hour violations. 235 The bill's sponsor criticized existing penalties as "minimal and offer[ing] little deterrent," but observed that this systemic shortcoming would "change dramatically," since "[p]enalties for violating employee rights would be increased in order to far better protect workers' rights and interests." 236 Similarly, NYDOL noted that the WTPA contains "numerous provisions intended to deter and punish the nonpayment or underpayment of wages to employees . . . . [including] increases [in] penalties . . . ; [and] liquidated damages that will be payable to employees under certain circumstances from 25 to 100 percent of amounts owed." 237 NYDOL observed that the WTPA would benefit underpaid low-wage workers who are deprived of income for rent, groceries, heating, and their families' other basic needs, and who must rely on public assistance. 238 NYDOL believed the WTPA would both "create new deterrents" and help these aggrieved workers "seek redress." 239 NYDOL urged the WTPA's enactment because the "[c]urrent penalties for wage theft are so low that there is a financial incentive to underpay workers." 240 As NELP explained, employers had little to lose, because the savings realized through underpayments "often outweigh the costs, even for those few who are apprehended." 241 NELP called upon the legislature to "up[] the ante" 242 for wage and hour violations "to better ensure compliance and deterrence." 243 Other interested parties, such as the New York City Council, 244 Jobs with Justice, 245 the Legal Aid Society, 246 and Make the Road 247 also supported enactment, bemoaning the inadequacy of the existing enforcement scheme. As the Legal Aid Society stated, "noncompliance with the basic protections of New York Labor Law is often the norm, not the exception . . . . The WTPA changes the economic incentives that encourage bad-actor employers to violate the law. . . . These new damages provide just that leverage." 248 Finally, Governor David A. Paterson issued a strongly worded statement approving the WTPA. Acknowledging concerns businesses and trade associations expressed over the WTPA's record-keeping and notice requirements, he asserted that it was "crucial" to "move forward and carry out the statute's comprehensive and important mandate to protect workers' rights . . . by deterring violations and by ensuring that employers who seek to deny those rights are sanctioned." 249 One of the few cases examining the WTPA's legislative history seized upon such language of deterrence as proof of legislative intent to address future violations, not to remedy past ones. In McLean v. Garage Management Corp., 250 Judge Denise L. Cote found "no evidence of legislative intent to apply the 100% liquidated damages amendment retroactively." 251 Instead, Judge Cote observed that "the Sponsor's Memorandum suggests that the legislature intended to increase the NYLL's liquidated damages penalty to better deter future violations of the state's labor laws." 252 
E. The NYLL's New Prejudgment Interest Provision
The 2010 Amendment inserted into section 198(1-a) an explicit provision for "prejudgment interest as required under the civil practice law and rules," in addition to liquidated damages. 253 New York's statutory prejudgment interest rate is 9 percent per annum. 254 The WTPA's bill jacket says nothing about this interest provision. 255 Neither do floor debates about the bill. 256 The inclusion of such a provision conjures two alternative interpretations of section 198(1-a)'s liquidated damages. On one hand, NYLL liquidated damages could be punitive in nature and simply supplemented by a compensatory prejudgment interest award designed to compensate employees for delay. On the other hand, the liquidated damages and the prejudgment interest could both be compensatory. Such a reading would not necessarily render either term superfluous. 257 In the latter scenario, prejudgment interest would guarantee employees a minimum level of compensation should an employer establish the goodfaith defense and become excused from paying liquidated damages altogether.
An analogous minimum recovery issue has sparked a split among circuit courts interpreting § 216 of the FLSA. Generally, courts follow Brooklyn Savings Bank and prohibit prejudgment interest in § 216 cases where the maximum (100 percent) liquidated damages are awarded. 258 Controversy arises, however, when a court reduces or eliminates liquidated damages pursuant to § 260. 259 Some circuits, including the Second Circuit, have concluded that employers who manage to avoid liquidated damages cannot be assessed prejudgment interest on the back pay awards for which they remain liable. 260 In contrast, the majority of courts have distinguished Brooklyn Savings Bank and awarded prejudgment interest when liquidated damages are denied. 261 Where partial liquidated damages are awarded, their relationship to prejudgment interest has been "inadequately explained." 262 Due to its silence, it is unclear whether the state legislature considered or sought to avoid a similar quandary.
III. WADING THROUGH THE FLOODWATERS: WHY COURTS SHOULD AWARD ONLY ONE SET OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Whether courts should award both FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages on the same underlying wage should not depend upon efforts to characterize each award as "compensatory" or "punitive," because such an approach presumes that a single clear "purpose" or "nature" can be found. Unfortunately, both the statutory text and the legislative history of section 198(1-a) send conflicting signals, suggesting a mixed purpose. Therefore, courts should recognize that the provisions are nearly identical and serve the same de facto purposes. [Vol. 81
A. The State Statutory Text Does Not Express an Exclusively Compensatory or Punitive Purpose
The statutory text sheds only a dim light upon legislative intent. First, the state legislature's characterization of the award as a "liquidated damage" indicates a compensatory purpose. The dictionary definition of "liquidated damages" suggests a compensatory function, because such damages compensate for losses that are hard to estimate, calculate, or prove. 263 Nonetheless, the term "liquidated damages" is not always used strictly according to its definition. For example, in Missel, Brooklyn Savings Bank, Thurston, Schleier, Reilly, and Carter, courts required extrinsic aids, like legislative history, to determine the respective purposes of "liquidated damages" provisions. 264 Furthermore, other NYLL provisions specifically employ the term "penalty" instead of "liquidated damages." 265 Such labels, however, do not necessarily govern intent. 266 Second, the lack of a "willfulness" or another scienter requirement indicates a compensatory purpose or at least the absence of a punitive one. Original interpretations of the 1967 Version as punitive relied upon both the willfulness requirement and the statute's legislative history. 267 Of course, the state legislature removed section 198(1-a)'s willfulness requirement, 268 and the 1967 Version's legislative history is much less clear-cut than courts have presented it to be. 269 While the presence or absence of a willfulness or a similar scienter requirement is not necessarily determinative, it is one of the chief considerations in analyzing the nature of a statutory liquidated damages provision. 270 For example, the Supreme Court cited a willfulness proviso as distinguishing the ADEA's otherwise substantially identical provision from the FLSA's. 271 Likewise, Carter decided that the 1967 Version's liquidated damages served as a "penalty" for class-action purposes, because only victims of "willful" violations would receive the additional award-others would recover only their unpaid wages. 272 Reilly, following suit, also emphasized the willfulness requirement. 273 (1-a) 's liquidated damages provision is "to deter an employer's willful withholding of wages" (emphasis added)). violations resulting from negligence or even ignorance will trigger liquidated damages. 274 The inclusion of a good-faith defense does not affect this analysis. 275 Because of the amendments, the punishment is no longer restricted to those who are blameworthy, and the deterrent is no longer restricted to those who might consider wrongdoing, so the provision's punitive nature is diminished.
Finally, the prejudgment interest provision does not require section 198(1-a)'s liquidated damages to be punitive, because the provision could be intended to ensure a minimum compensatory recovery, as previously discussed. 276 
B. The State Legislative History Does Not Express an Exclusively Compensatory or Punitive Purpose
Because the text expresses no clear compensatory or punitive purpose, courts should turn to extrinsic materials for evidence of legislative intent. 277 Regrettably, like the text, the legislative history provides no clear answer. Instead, the legislative history sends conflicting signals. As illustrated above in Part II, and as discussed below, some portions emphasize compensating workers and conformity with the FLSA, while others focus on deterring and punishing violations.
First, the 1967 Version's legislative history contains numerous references to compensation. 278 Documents in the bill jacket suggest that the 25 percent liquidated damages the 1967 Version provided to employees were intended to be simultaneously compensatory and punitive in nature. 279 Memoranda from the bill's sponsor, the governor, and the enforcing agency all explicitly stated that the liquidated damages would compensate employees for the consequences of employers' violations. 280 Their unanimous concern over compensation makes sense. Low-wage workers comprise an especially vulnerable demographic, and the impact of withheld wages might be so severe and difficult to prove that ordinary prejudgment interest would not provide sufficient remuneration for their unique injuries. 281 As previously discussed, providing an estimated award that bypasses the need to prove special damages is exactly what "liquidated damages" normally do. 282 Indeed, such concerns underlie the FLSA's liquidated damages provision. 283 At the very least, these sources demonstrate that prejudgment interest would duplicate a portion, however small, of the 25 percent liquidated damages, which, when awarded, were intended to compensate employees for the delay in payment. Further, concluding that the 1967 Version contained a compensatory element does not conflict with Carter, because Carter did not rule out the possibility. 284 The specific question of prejudgment interest was not presented in Carter, and Carter did not hold that the 1967 Version's liquidated damages are exclusively punitive. 285 The Supreme Court has indicated that statutory damages may serve multiple purposes. 286 Thus, to the extent that the 1967 Version's legislative history supports Reilly's interpretation of Carter as standing for the proposition that the liquidated damages are exclusively "punitive," such an interpretation can only survive in combination with the 1967 Version's willfulness requirement, which no longer exists. 287 Rather, one of the reasons for amending section 198(1-a) was conformity with the FLSA. 288 Conformity entails bringing the two statutes into agreement with one another. The 2009 Amendment's legislative history shows that interested parties, including the bill's sponsor, contemplated conformity with the FLSA as a goal, not simply a side effect. 289 With conformity as a goal, it would be unlikely that the drafters intended for plaintiffs to receive two sets of liquidated damages. Otherwise, whether or not the state provision "conforms" to its federal counterpart would be irrelevant-a plaintiff could recover under both statutes regardless of conformity.
If, however, the legislators intended to provide state protections as an alternative to those under federal law, then it seems likely that they would be very much concerned with having the NYLL "conform" to the FLSA, which provides compensatory liquidated damages. 290 Indeed, by removing the willfulness requirement, the legislature eased the employee's evidentiary burdens.
This change was remedial, not prophylactic, because employees find themselves in the courtroom only after wage and hour violations have already occurred. 291 It is clear, however, that the 2010 Amendment's primary purposes were deterrence and retribution. Assorted memoranda supporting the bill, including the sponsor's and the governor's, consistently expressed such sentiments. 292 The WTPA finally upped the ante after New York spent decades under an ineffective enforcement system. 293 Since the 2010 Amendment increased liquidated damages from 25 percent to 100 percent, it would be reasonable to conclude that the difference is punitive. Dissecting the liquidated damages award, however, would still leave the remaining 25 percent undefined and lead to complicated calculations, essentially defeating the very utility of a "liquidated" award. Permitting the punitive purposes of the increase to overwhelm the mixed purposes of the original award is also unacceptable. 294 
C. The Federal and State Liquidated Damages Provisions Overlap
Neither the statutory text nor the legislative history unambiguously points towards either an exclusively compensatory or punitive purpose. Therefore, courts have a couple of options. First, they could, and should, recognize the fact that both compensatory and punitive considerations shaped the state legislation. Upon doing so, they should award only one set of liquidated damages to avoid duplicating the portion of state liquidated damages, whatever that portion might be, which the legislature deemed appropriate compensation for the harms of wage underpayment. Alternatively, courts confronting demands for both FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages on the same underlying wage could adopt a practical approach, under which they should also award one set of liquidated damages.
Under the current statutory scheme, it does not matter whether section 198(1-a)'s liquidated damages are exclusively compensatory, punitive, or both.
First, if the NYLL's liquidated damages are exclusively compensatory, the double recovery doctrine obviously would prohibit combining them with the FLSA's liquidated damages. Similarly, if the NYLL's liquidated damages are both compensatory and punitive, then combining them with the FLSA's liquidated damages would duplicate the compensatory aspect of the state award. Finally, even if the NYLL's liquidated damages are exclusively punitive, the double recovery doctrine would still prohibit their combination with the FLSA's, because the NYLL already provides plaintiffs a compensatory remedy for delay in the form of prejudgment interest. 295 Prejudgment interest is a compensatory award for the delayed use of money. 296 Since the state legislature was aware of the existing federal scheme, another relevant question is whether it intended to provide an additional or alternative award. Through the NYLL, the state legislature has constructed a comprehensive statutory scheme that both compensates victims when wage underpayment occurs and punishes and deters violators. 301 In addition to liquidated damages, its myriad other mechanisms for punishment and deterrence include the specter of large civil penalties, criminal fines, and even imprisonment. 302 Liquidated damages differ because they impact employees' pockets, not the state's. Therefore, like the FLSA, the NYLL incentivizes private enforcement, saving the government money. 303 The parallels between the state and federal schemes support the conclusion that the NYLL's liquidated damages are an alternative to the FLSA's. As a deterrent, section 198(1-a)'s provisions are no more persuasive than the FLSA's, and as a punishment, they are no more painful. 304 Both statutes address the same harm, provide employees the same remedy, and grant employers essentially the same defense. 305 Without compelling contrary evidence, awarding liquidated damages under both statutes on the same underlying wage constitutes a double recovery that courts should avoid.
CONCLUSION
Courts facing demands for liquidated damages under both the FLSA and the NYLL should not award them under both statutes. In light of the conflicting textual and historical evidence, a dichotomous approach or a "judgment call" choosing one purpose over the other would disregard the fact that both compensatory and punitive considerations shaped the state legislation. NYLL liquidated damages should be recognized for what they are-both compensatory and punitive in nature. Consequently, courts can only avoid double recovery by awarding liquidated damages under one statute.
